

TOWARDS THE ESSENCE, VARIETIES AND MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-PARTISM AND ANTI-PARTY SENTIMENTS IN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES

The article is dedicated to analyzing the essence, types and manifestations of anti-partism and the nature of anti-party sentiments of citizens of European representative democracies, including at the background of the phenomena of non-partism and technocracy. This is done in several contexts, including historiographical, theoretical, methodological, practical and empirical ones. It has been stated that anti-partism is one of the primary, but important manifestations of the “decline” or “crisis” of parties in Europe and democracies, although it does not necessarily lead to, but can be the cause of non-partism or technocracy. At the same time, the article proves that anti-partism in European countries is a heterogeneous rather than a monolithic and combined phenomenon, since it manifests itself in different ways and in different forms, in particular as “reactive” and “cultural” ones. Different in their origins and consequences, these forms of anti-partism are united by the fact that they are part of a general syndrome of political apathy, political discontent and the “erosion” of democracy. At the same time, the phenomenon of non-partism is facilitated primarily by “reactive” rather than “cultural” anti-partism.

Keywords: anti-partism, non-partism, representative democracy, parties, European countries.

O ISTOCIE, ODMIANACH I PRZEJAWACH ANTYPARTYJNOŚCI I ANTYPARTYJNYCH NASTROJACH W EUROPEJSKICH DEMOKRACJACH PRZEDSTAWICIELSKICH

W artykule przeanalizowano istotę, rodzaje i przejawy antypartyjności oraz charakter nastrojów antypartyjnych obywateli europejskich demokracji przedstawicielskich, w tym na tle zjawisk bezpartyjności i technokracji. Odbywa się to w kilku kontekstach, w tym historyograficznym, teoretycznym i metodologicznym oraz praktycznym i empirycznym. Stwierdzono, że antypartyjność jest jednym z podstawowych, ale ważnych przejawów „upadku” lub „kryzysu” partii w demokracjach europejskich, choć niekoniecznie prowadzi, ale może być przyczyną bezpartyjności lub technokracji. Jednocześnie w artykule udowadnia się, że antypartyjność w krajach europejskich jest zjawiskiem niejednorodnym, nie monolitycznym i niekombinowanym, gdyż przejawia się na różne sposoby i w różnych formach, w szczególności jako „reaktywna” i „kulturowa”. Zróżnicowane za swoim pochodzeniem i skutkami, te formy antypartyjności łączy fakt, że są one częścią ogólnego syndromu politycznej apatii, politycznego niezadowolenia

i „erozji” demokracji. Jednocześnie zjawisku antypartyjności sprzyja przede wszystkim antypartyjność „reaktywna”, a nie „kulturowa”.

Słowa kluczowe: antypartyjność, bezpartyjność, demokracja przedstawicielska, partie, kraje europejskie

ДО СУТНОСТІ, РІЗНОВИДІВ І ВИЯВІВ АНТИПАРТИЗМУ Й АНТИПАРТІЙНИХ НАСТРОЇВ У ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИХ ПРЕДСТАВНИЦЬКИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЯХ

У статті проаналізовано сутність, різновиди і вияви антипартизму й природу антипартійних настроїв громадян європейських представницьких демократій, в тому числі на тлі феноменів непартизму та технократизму. Це зроблено в кількох контекстах, зокрема історіографічному, теоретико-методологічному й практично-емпіричному. Констатовано, що антипартизм є одним з первинних, але важливих виявів “занепаду” або “кризи” партій у європейських демократіях, хоч він не обов’язково призводить, однак може бути причиною непартизму чи технократизму. Воднораз у статті засвідчено, що антипартизм в країнах Європи є гетерогенним, а не монолітним та комбінованим феноменом, оскільки він виявляється по-різному та в різних формах, зокрема передусім як “реактивний” і “культурний”. Будучи різними за своїм походженням і наслідками, ці форми антипартизму поєднує те, що вони є частиною загального синдрому політичної апатії, політичного невдоволення та “ерозії” демократії. Воднораз явищу непартизму сприяє передусім “реактивний”, а не “культурний” антипартизм.

Ключові слова: антипартизм, непартизм, представницька демократія, партії, країни Європи.

European political space for a long period of recent historical development is structured in such a way that it is defined and understood mainly as party-determined and party-oriented and this party focus is one of the main components of the European representative democracies. And in this regard, neither politicians nor ordinary citizens during the period after the Second World War actually had or had almost no doubts and comments. However, the situation has begun to change dramatically and significantly against the background of various crises that have recently, in recent decades, affected Europe, in particular as a result of the global financial crisis, which unfolded in 2008-2009, a new round of the so-called European migration crisis, starting in 2014-2015, as well as social, managerial and other manifestations of the crisis following the pandemic COVID-19, which has been going on since 2019. It is complemented by the

fact that in some European countries, trust in parties as a major factor in structuring political and administrative process and socio-political life is constantly fluctuating depending on the successes or failures of government cabinets, which are usually formed in the region on a party basis. Against this background, in recent years, the “gap of trust” has undermined public support for many institutions. Accordingly, quite often on the agenda of European representative democracies, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, there started to appear the question of so-called technocratic (instead of party) government, and thus, in general, the ideas of a kind of non-partism or anti-partism, which are manifested primarily in the anti-party sentiments of both the population and individual politicians, and so on. All these things actualize the formulation and consideration of the theme of the phenomenon and manifestations of antipartism and anti-party sentiments in European representative democracies.

The stated issues in a purely theoretical and methodological context are partially considered in the scientific works of such scientists as U. Ackay¹, E. Bryld², M. Centeno³, L. Wolfson³, H. Clarke and M. Stewart⁴, H. Daalder⁵, R. Dalton, I. McAllister⁶, M. Wattenberg⁶, E. Eriksen⁷, J. Gunnell⁸, R. Katz⁹, B. Khoo¹⁰, S. Lakoff¹¹, K. Lawson and P. Merkl¹², P. Mair¹³, J. Meynaud¹⁴, E. Millstone¹⁵, S. Odugbemi¹⁶, G. Pastorella¹⁷, G. Peters¹⁸, T. Poguntke¹⁹, S. Scarrow¹⁹, R. Put-

¹ Ackay U., *Technocrats in Power?*, Prepared for the conference „The State in Capitalist Society, 40 Years On“, 22 May 2009.

² Bryld E., *The Technocratic Discourse: Technical Means to Political Problems*, „Development in Practice“ 2000, vol 10, nr. 5, s. 700-705.

³ Centeno M., *The New Leviathan: The Dynamic and Limits of Technocracy*, „Theory and Society“ 1993, vol 22, s. 307-335; Centeno M., Wolfson L., *Redefiniendo la tecnocracia*, „Desarrollo Económico“ 1997, vol 37, nr. 146, s. 215-240.

⁴ Clarke H., Stewart M., *The Decline of Parties in the Mind of Citizens*, „Annual Review of Political Science“ 1998, vol 1, s. 357-378.

⁵ Daalder H., *Parties: Denied, Dismissed or Redundant?*, [w:] Gunther R., Montero J., Linz J. (eds.), *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 39-57.

⁶ Dalton R., McAllister I., Wattenberg M., *The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment*, [w:] Dalton R., Wattenberg M. (eds.), *Parties without Partisans, Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2002, s. 37-63; Dalton R., Wattenberg M., *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

⁷ Eriksen E., *Democratic or technocratic governance?*, [w:] Joerges C., Mény Y., Weiler J. (eds.), *Montain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White Paper on Governance*, „Jean Monnet Working Paper“ 2001, nr. 6/01.

⁸ Gunnell J., *The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy*, „Technology and Culture“ 1982, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 392-416.

⁹ Katz R., *Party Government and its Alternatives*, [w:] Katz R. (ed.), *Party Governments: European and American Experiences*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1987, s. 1-26.

¹⁰ Khoo B., *No insulation: politics and technocracy's troubled trajectory*, „IDE Discussion Paper“ 2010, vol 236.

¹¹ Lakoff S., *Knowledge, Power, and Democratic Theory*, „Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science“ 1972, vol 394, s. 4-12.

¹² Lawson K., Merkl P., *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1988.

¹³ Mair P., *The Challenge to Party Government*, „EUI Working Paper SPS“ 2007, nr 9.

¹⁴ Meynaud J., *Technocracy*, New York 1968.

¹⁵ Millstone E., *Science-Based Policy Making*, [w:] Bogner A., Torgersen H. (eds.), *Wozu Experten? Ambivalenzen der Beziehung von Wissenschaft und Politik*, Wyd. VS Verlag 2005, s. 314-341.

¹⁶ Odugbemi S., *The Enduring Allurement of Technocratic Competence*, Wyd. People, Spaces, Deliberation 2011.

¹⁷ Pastorella G., *Technocratic governments: democracy by other means*, Presented at UACES General Conference (Panel: The Role of Expertise in Political Integration, Cork), 2014; Pastorella G., *Technocratic Governments in Europe: Getting the Critique Right*, „Political Studies“ 2016, vol 64, nr. 4, s. 948-965.

¹⁸ Peters G., *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*, „Comparative Politics“ 1979, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 339-358.

¹⁹ Poguntke T., *Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 319-344; Poguntke T., Scarrow S., *The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 257-262.

nam²⁰, A. Schedler²¹, V. Schmidt²², M. Schudson²³, D. Skelton²⁴, J. Straussman²⁵, P. Weingart²⁶, G. Wilson²⁷. Empirically, non-partisanship, anti-partisanship and anti-party sentiments of the population in European countries were once written by such scholars as O. Amorim Neto and K. Strøm²⁸, H. Brunkhorst²⁹, M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli³⁰, M. de Jong and M. Mentzel³¹, R. Fischer³², A. Harcourt and C. Radaelli³², J. Hopkin³³, E. Huskey³⁴, C. Invernizzi Accettita B³⁵. Christopher³⁶, G.-E. Isaksson³⁷, F. Marangoni L. Verzichelli³⁸, P. Marquardt³⁹, D. Mathioudakis⁴⁰, D. McDonnell and M. Valbruzzi⁴¹, G. Pasquino M. Valbruzzi⁴², H. Reiter⁴³, G. Sani and

²⁰ Putnam R., *Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies: An empirical assessment of the theory of technocracy*, „Comparative Political Studies“ 1997, vol 10, s. 388-412.

²¹ Schedler A., *Anti-political-establishment Parties*, „Party Politics“ 1996, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 291-312.

²² Schmidt V., *Can Technocratic Government Be Democratic*, Wyd. Telos 2011.

²³ Schudson M., *The Trouble with Experts and Why Democracies Need Them*, „Theory and Society“ 2006, vol 35, nr. 5, s. 491-506.

²⁴ Skelton D., *Government of the technocrats, by the technocrats, for the technocrats*, Wyd. New Statesman 2011.

²⁵ Straussman J., *The Limits of Technocratic Politics*, Wyd. Edison 1978.

²⁶ Weingart P., *Scientific expertise and political accountability: paradoxes of science in politics*, „Science and Public Policy“ 1999, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 151-161.

²⁷ Wilson G., *Beyond the Technocrat? The Professional Expert in Development Practice*, „Development and Change“ 2006, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 501-523.

²⁸ Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies*, „British Journal of Political Science“ 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619-643.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“ (The Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, Denmark), August 15-17, 2002.

²⁹ Brunkhorst H., *The crisis of Europe as a Crisis of Technocratic Politics*, Unpublished lecture 2012.

³⁰ Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen*, „South European Society and Politics“ 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117-152.; Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Italy: the sunset of a partyocracy*, [w:] Blondel J., Cotta M. (eds.), *Party and government. An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996, s. 180-201.; Verzichelli L., Cotta M., *Technicians, technical government and non-partisan ministers. The Italian experience*, Presented at IPSA XXII Congress (Madrid), July 2012.

³¹ de Jong M., Mentzel M., *Policy and science: options for democratisation in European countries*, „Science and Public Policy“ 2001, vol 28, s. 403-412.

³² Fischer R., *European governance still technocratic? New modes of governance for food safety regulation in the European Union*, „EioP“ 2008, vol 12.

³³ Harcourt A., Radaelli C., *Limits to EU technocratic regulation?*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 1999, vol 35, nr. 1, s. 107-122.

³⁴ Hopkin J., *Technocrats have taken over governments in Southern Europe. This is a challenge to democracy*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2012.

³⁵ Huskey E., *Elite Recruitment and State-Society Relationships in Technocratic Authoritarian Regime: The Russian Case*, „Communist and Post-Communist Studies“ 2010, vol 43, nr. 4, s. 363-372.

³⁶ Invernizzi Accetti C., Christopher B., *Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements? Crisis and Representation*, Wyd. London School of Economics 2013.

³⁷ Isaksson G.-E., *From Election to Government: Principal Rules and Deviant Cases*, „Government and Opposition“ 2005, vol 40, nr. 1, s. 90-118.

³⁸ Marangoni F., *Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office*, „Bulletin of Italian Politics“ 2012, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 135-149.; Marangoni F., Verzichelli L., *Italy: from personalized polarization to technocratic co-operation?*, Presented at 2012 SISIP Congress (Roma), 13-14 September 2012.

³⁹ Marquardt P., *Deficit Reduction: Democracy, Technocracy, and Constitutionalism in The European Union*, „Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law“ 1994, vol 4, s. 265-290.

⁴⁰ Mathioudakis D., *“Who are you people?” Imported technocracy and democratic legitimacy in the EU*, Presented at the Political Science Association Annual Conference (Manchester), April 2014.

⁴¹ McDonnell D., Valbruzzi M., *Defining and classifying technocrat-led and technocratic governments*, „European Journal of Political Research“ 2014, vol 53, nr. 4, s. 654-671.

⁴² Pasquino G., Valbruzzi M., *Non-partisan governments Italian-style: decision-making and accountability*, „Journal of Modern Italian Studies“ 2012, vol 17, nr. 5, s. 612-629.

⁴³ Reiter H., *Party Decline in the West: A Skeptic's View*, „Journal of Theoretical Politics“ 1989, vol 1, s. 325-348.

P. Segatti⁴⁴, S. Scarrow⁴⁵, V. Schmidt⁴⁶, K. Strøm and L. Svåsand⁴⁷, W. Wallace and J. Smith⁴⁸, P. Webb⁴⁹ and others.

However, they focused on non-partisan government and technocracy rather than the phenomenon of anti-partism and anti-party sentiment in European representative democracies, especially against the background of the crisis and the transformation of the essence and coverage of the concept of “party”. Therefore, the present study focuses on the components, conditions and parameters of non-partism, and on the attributes of anti-partism in the current state of development of parties and party systems in European representative democracies, both in theoretical and methodological terms, and in practical and empirical contexts.

It is well known that non-partism and anti-partism have two basic causes of formation and development, in particular: positive, it is through the prism of theorizing and testing the effects of technocracy on the replacement or in parallel with the party and party-determined competition; negative, it is through the prism of the crisis and compromising the phenomenon of political parties and party politics in general in a given state. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of non-partism can be developed both at the expense of anti-partism, on the contrary. Therefore, in this context we configure research on their relationship, but through the prism of clarifying the essence and nature of anti-party sentiments – both purely theoretically and by example of the European representative democracies, in which in the 90s of the 20th century critical images of political parties started to become very noticeable⁵⁰. The fact is that it has been since that period a number of European and non-European representative democracies began to reflect on the “crisis of parties” and this expression became very familiar to almost every theorist in the sphere of political science, for it concerned not only the parties but also the general format of interinstitutional relations and the parameters of the institutions of power functioning (first of all the government, parliament, and political elites in general), configured around the role and importance of parties as such (which was the norm for European democracies)⁵¹. The main focus of such a phrase or its derivatives use in various European countries has been the realizing that civil society has increasingly resorted to the interpretation and perception of political parties as being too selfish and aimed at their own political interests rather than at achieving goals

⁴⁴ Sani G., Segatti P., *Antiparty Politics and the Restructuring of the Italian Party System*, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 153-182.

⁴⁵ Scarrow S., *Politicians Against Parties: Anti-party Arguments as Weapons for Change in Germany*, “European Journal of Political Research” 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 297-317.

⁴⁶ Schmidt V., *Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and “Throughput”*, „Political Studies” 2013, vol 61, nr. 1, s. 2-22.

⁴⁷ Strøm K., Svåsand L., *Challenges to Political Parties. The Case of Norway*, Wyd. The University of Michigan Press 1997.

⁴⁸ Wallace W., Smith J., *Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent*, „West European Politics” 1995, vol 18, nr. 3, s. 137-157.

⁴⁹ Webb P., *Are British Political Parties in Decline?*, “Party Politics” 1995, vol 1, s. 299-322.

⁵⁰ Listhaug O., Wiberg M., *Confidence in Political and Private Institutions*, [w:] Klingemann H.-D., Fuchs D. (eds.), *Citizens and the State*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1995, s. 298-322.

⁵¹ Eilfort M., *Politikverdrossenheit and the Non-voter*, “German Politics” 1995, vol 4, s. 111-119; Immerfall S., *German Party Sociology in the Nineties: On the State of a Discipline in Times of Turmoil*, “European Journal for Political Research” 1993, vol 23, s. 465-482.

of common well-being, and hence to the interpretation of parties as incapable to implement and pursue a consistent policy without a corruption component⁵². Therefore, after some time, the so-called anti-party rhetoric has become a common element of political discourse in many modern European democracies⁵³, including due the development of a cluster of anti-establishment policies and even, paradoxically, anti-establishment parties. Although, on the other hand, interest in limiting the role, importance and influence of political parties has become primarily a sphere of interest and activity of journalists, publicists, political and social scientists.

In particular, a group of political scientists began to argue that in the development of the phenomenon of parties in European representative democracies, defects began to appear primarily at the level of organizational structure, functions and membership in parties, and therefore in the context of the effectiveness of parties in various representative (especially in parliaments) and government (especially in governments) institutions of various countries. Instead, another group of political scientists focused on concerns about the growing negative attitudes of citizens or voters toward political parties.

Even though very little attention has been paid in the intelligence of these authors to the issue of declining public support for parties, instead, emphasis was placed on such topics as the development of party identification, party participation in elections, and the parties' traditional social ties with civil society, which are theoretically and previously / traditionally mandatory in the case of party-determined representative democracies in Europe. As a result, all this led to the formation of a whole array of anti-party views and even to the postulation of the hypothesis of "decline" or "crisis" of parties in the analyzed part of the world, but views not entirely homogeneous, but focused on interinstitutional relations and institutional design on one hand, and ideological, electoral and functional essence of political parties as such, on the other hand. Although, in contrast, such an array of the surveys and research turned out to be very heterogeneous, after all different scientists began to identify different components and parameters to attest to the phenomenon of anti-partism, including phenomena, concepts and processes: reduction of party identification of the parties themselves and party belonging / affiliation of citizens, and hence electoral instability of parties, including through the formation of so-called anti-systemic / anti-establishment parties⁵⁴; strengthening the phenomenon of ideological rapprochement (in the direction of a conditional party-ideological center) of previously differently ideological parties⁵⁵; weakening the ties of political parties with citizens and

⁵² Poguntke T., Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 320.

⁵³ Poguntke T., Scarrow S., The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 257-262

⁵⁴ Poguntke T., Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 319-344.

⁵⁵ Webb P., Are British Political Parties in Decline?, "Party Politics" 1995, vol 1, s. 303.; Reiter H., Party Decline in the West: A Skeptic's View, "Journal of Theoretical Politics" 1989, vol 1, s. 327-328.

civil society⁵⁶. As a result, political science has a very inaccurate understanding of the “decline” or “crisis” of parties, although almost all theorists and practitioners agree that this “decline” or “crisis” of parties is valid in representative democracies in Europe.

The situation regarding the diversity of European anti-partism is due to its origins, which are also heterogeneous, as many scholars, journalists and publicists have argued and continue to do so that this phenomenon is based on different concepts and different ways of defining and measuring anti-party sentiment. Therefore, there have always been differing opinions in the research community about how widespread anti-partism is in certain countries and therefore how expressed and influential are its immediate consequences.

For example, German scholars have generally viewed and continue to view anti-party sentiment as a temporary response by citizens to the political events of the early 1990s, particularly in the context of German unification and the economic and corruption crisis of the period⁵⁷. This view was shared by Spanish researchers, who noted that during and shortly after the country's transition to democracy, particularly in the 1970s, the popular or nation-wide image of political parties was much more positive than in the mid-1980s, when attitudes toward political parties deteriorated sharply, particularly in the wake of corruption scandals in the early 1990s and beyond⁵⁸. Other scholars, on the other hand, appealed to clarify the parameters of the nature and possible causes of the formation and manifestations of the anti-partism phenomenon in certain countries, in particular depending on the peculiarities of their political culture and political history (even in the interwar period)⁵⁹. In general, it is established that the decline in support for political parties and the phenomenon of anti-partisanship necessarily relate to the specific political circumstances in each country, as well as the experience and parameters of the development of representative democracy in it⁵⁹. At the same time, the growth of anti-party sentiments in general is not a very short-term process, but rather a long-term one, due to which it is accompanied by a parallel decline in the level of trust in all representative one or another modern democracy, in particular due to the formation of a kind of gap and tension in relations between political elites, individuals and social groups, which they theoretically represent.

As for the consequences of anti-partisanship, they are also variable, because in one case we are talking about the emergence of populist, anti-establishment, anti-systemic and xenophobic parties in some countries⁶⁰, in another case it is the rejection of the main parties and the cynical attitude of either citizens to parties or party members to party leaders⁶¹, and in another

⁵⁶ Poguntke T., Scarrow S., The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction, “European Journal of Political Research” 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 259.

⁵⁷ Wiesendahl E., The Present State and Future Prospects of the German Volksparteien, “German Politics” 1998, vol 7, s. 151-175.

⁵⁸ Wert J., Sobre cultura política: legitimidad, desafección y malestar, [w:] Tusell J., Lamo de Espinosa E., Pardo R. (eds.), Entre dos siglos: reflexiones sobre la democracia española, Wyd. Alianza Editorial 1996.

⁵⁹ Sani G., Segatti P., Antiparty Politics and the Restructuring of the Italian Party System, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 153-182.

⁶⁰ Reiter H., Party Decline in the West: A Skeptic's View, “Journal of Theoretical Politics” 1989, vol 1, s. 325-348.

⁶¹ Mudde C., The Paradox of the Anti-party Party: Insights From the Extreme Right, “Party Politics” 1996, vol 2, s. 265-276.; Schedler A., Anti-political-establishment Parties, “Party Politics” 1996, vol 2, nr. 2, s. 291-312.

case it is the reduction of general support for a democratic political regime and the growth of anti-systemic behavior of political actors⁶².

As a result, the theoretical and empirical contradictions about anti-partism and public anti-party sentiment in European countries determine the different options for anti-partisanship itself in terms of its origins and behavioral consequences, including so-called “reactive anti-partism” and “cultural anti-partism.”

Thus, “reactive anti-partism” is one of the most important positions taken by citizens in response to their dissatisfaction with the activities of party elites and party-determined political institutions. This option of anti-partism is the result of a mismatch between promises and ideological labels, on the one hand, and citizens’ perceptions of the real productivity of democracy and elite, on the other. Thus, “reactive anti-partisanship” is in some sense the sensiological consequence of “excessive promises” by politicians in the context of their dependence on political discourse, which raises expectations about such promises among the public to an extent that will be difficult to achieve. In addition, this version of anti-partism is also a response to the actual failures of political parties and political elites in the context of government implementation⁶³, because many social, political and economic problems simply cannot be solved, but party leaders often ignore this, behaving irresponsibly and abusing their access to public resources and privileges, including in a corrupt format, and so on. In other words, anti-partisanship in this view is nothing more than an expression of political realism in the discourse and political rhetoric of the citizens⁶⁴, especially against the background of the fact that as political reality changes over time, one should expect changes in the scale and intensity of people’s negative attitudes towards parties in the context of changing political, economic and social developments⁶⁵. This is especially true (in the direction of growing of anti-partism) when society is made up of more educated, politically informed and interested residents who are better prepared to participate in politics, after all, among them, feelings of alienation from parties are more common due to

⁶² Taggart P., *Riding the Wave: New Populist Parties in Western Europe*, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research (Madrid), 1994.

⁶³ Bruneau T., *Political Parties and Democracy in Portugal: Organizations, Elections and Public Opinion*, Wyd. Westview Press 1997.; Bruneau T., *Democracy: Southern European Style?*, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), *Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 16-82.; Pradera J., *La maquinaria de la democracia. Los partidos en el sistema político español*, [w:] Tusell J., Lamo E. de Espinosa, Pardo R. (eds.), *Entre dos siglos: reflexiones sobre la democracia española*, Wyd. Alianza Editorial 1996.; Mendrinou M., Nicolacopoulos I., *Interests, Parties and Discontent in the Public Mind: Sympathy Scores for Greek Parties and Interest Groups*, Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research (Bern), 1997.

⁶⁴ Poguntke T., *Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield*, *European Journal of Political Research* 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 327.

⁶⁵ Gabriel O., *The Confidence Crisis in Germany*, Paper presented at the conference “The Erosion of Confidence in Advanced Democracies” (Society of Comparative Research and the Université Libre de Bruxelles), 1996, s. 16-17.; Noelle-Neumann E., *Left and Right as Categories for Determining the Politics Position of the Parties and the Population in Germany*, Paper presented at the symposium “Political Parties: Changing Role in Contemporary Democracies” (Madrid), 1994, s. 43-45.

a somewhat better understanding of the essence of democracy, much greater expectations of political life and greater ability to identify the machinations of politicians and parties⁶⁶.

Instead, “cultural anti-partism” is based on historical traditions and basic values of political culture, and therefore does not depend on short-term changes in the political situation in a country, but it does on long-term experience of party life in each of them. In this context, anti-partisanship is essentially dependent on the experience of democracy, pseudo-democracy, dictatorship, the history of political upheaval and development, election manipulation, the facts of negative socialization in the political process in a country and so on⁶⁷. In this sense, “cultural anti-partism” manifests itself as the citizens’ assessment of politics and the political process, as well as their personal influence, or, in other words, as a rational response, the result of historical experience that hardly encourages trust in political life under party auspices⁶⁸. This is most evident in the case of any experience of an autocratic regime in a country, as autocracies a priori instill anti-party sentiments in the population, in particular through propaganda campaigns and formal socialization in educational institutions. In this regard, it is not reasonable to expect that “cultural anti-partism” can be closely linked to other cynical or negative assessments of democratic politics, which are part of a wider syndrome of political dissatisfaction, in particular with the phenomenon of support and legitimization of democratic regimes and dissatisfaction with the activities of political institutions and officials⁶⁹. Although, in contrast, political discontent as a phenomenon includes a subjective sense of distance from politics and political institutions, cynicism and a general interest in politics, as well as low levels of political participation⁷⁰, therefore, it can be expected that this syndrome of frustration, apathy and passivity will include a negative attitude towards political parties.

From all this it follows that these two types of anti-partism – “reactive” and “cultural” ones must have very different behavioral consequences. Thus, on the one hand, “reactive anti-partisanship” is a negative assessment and, consequently, an array of criticism against the poor and ineffective work of party institutions and leaders, although it may have a positive effect on mobilizing citizens and encouraging and meeting the requirements for improving or changing elected positions⁷¹.

⁶⁶ Dalton R., *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western Democracies*, Wyd. Chatham House 1996; Putnam R., Pharr S., Dalton R., Introduction: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?, [w:] Pharr S., Putnam R. (eds.), *Disaffected Democracies. What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2000, s. 3-30.

⁶⁷ Maravall J., *Regimes, Politics, and Markets. Democratization and Economic Change in Southern and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997, s. 237.; Aguilar P., *Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española*, Wyd. Alianza Editorial 1996.; Sani G., Segatti P., *Antiparty Politics and the Restructuring of the Italian Party System*, [w:] Diamandouros P., Gunther R. (eds.), *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001, s. 153-182.

⁶⁸ Burton M., Gunther R., Higley J., Introduction: *Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes*, [w:] Higley J., Gunther R. (eds.), *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 5-6.

⁶⁹ Gunther R., Montero J., *Legitimacy, Satisfaction and Disaffection in New Democracies*, Wyd. Centre for the Study of Public Policy (University of Strathclyde) 2000.; Montero J., Gunther R., Torcal M., *Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, Discontent and Disaffection*, “*Studies in Comparative International Development*” 1997, vol 32, s. 124-160.

⁷⁰ Torcal M., Montero J., *Political Disaffection in New Democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

⁷¹ Dalton R., *Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, [w:] Norris P. (ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 75-76.

Instead, on the other hand, “cultural anti-partism” is a strong characteristic of subculture policies to ensure diversity, for as an important component of political discontent; “cultural anti-partism” can widen the gap between citizens and their institutions and strengthen the marginalized sector of the population in a competitive democratic regime, making the latter less effective and of lower quality.

At the same time, the “strength” of anti-party sentiments of the population can also be quite different and configured on the basis of various explanatory factors. This is especially true given the fact that the attitude of the population / citizens towards political parties is very ambivalent, if not contradictory, and therefore it manifests itself in different ways within the framework of different options of anti-partism, although it is more negative (but also more heterogeneous from country to country in Europe) in the case of “cultural anti-partism”. This is complemented by the fact that the origins of anti-party sentiment in different European representative democracies are different. But in general, there are trends according to which: the longer and cumulative anti-party sentiment, the more negative this attitude is in general in different age groups; political dissatisfaction, including with regard to parties, is systematically increasing among the older age groups⁷². At the same time, it is established that the cultural-anti-party attitude does not reflect the general or permanent elements of the political culture of a state, but instead reflects separate social experiences within different political contexts that affect in many ways different “political” generations. Quite often this is manifested in the fact that even the very successful actions of the current democratic regime as such are not able to eradicate anti-party sentiments among the older (in the age sense) population, since only its “disappearance” can be a prerequisite for reducing the level of “cultural anti-partism”. On the other hand, such correlations are not observed in the case of “reactive antipartism”, which is rather situational and serves as a format for responding to political institutional crises in the environment and as a result of interparty relations. The only thing that quite effectively links the two options of antipartism for the reasons of their origin is the attitude according to which the more conscious and rational is a citizen; the less likely it is that his views will be anti-party ones.

However, the most important thing in this case is that, in essence, party dissatisfaction or so-called anti-partisanship includes or presupposes the desire of the population for change and reveals certain advantages in relation to political goals and means. Moreover, simply dissatisfaction or almost complete satisfaction with the positions of the parties pushes the population to the desire for reform, and the position of an anti-party nature to the need for radical and systemic change.

In conclusion, this suggests that “cultural anti-partisanship” in this context is the part of a broad syndrome of political discontent, while “reactive anti-partisanship” is conceptually and empirically different, as it demonstrates an attitude that is associated with political dissatisfaction with the current government and the current political system. This relationship

⁷² Torcal M., Montero J., *Political Disaffection in New Democracies*, Wyd. Routledge 2012.

intensifies in two directions when the share of the uneducated or uneducated population is higher in one or another country. It is this result and conclusion that is compatible with the interpretation that anti-partism is a formative part of the political discontent syndrome. At the same time, the expression or non-expression of ideas and positions against parties does not necessarily correlate with the attitude of the population of certain countries to democracy, since the vast majority of the population of European countries support the logic and construction of representative democracy, even regardless of their attitude to the parties. Also noteworthy is the fact that supporters of anti-party sentiments are less interested in the domestic policies of their countries, more cynical about their politicians and are strongly influenced by the press. At most, such sentiments and correlations are exacerbated in the case of at least partial autocratization of political regimes, even though they remain representative democracies.

In general, it is found in the study that anti-party sentiments can affect the quality of democracy in a country. In addition, among the various dynamic consequences and effects of anti-partism, there is a gradual destruction of the psychological commitment of voters to parties (so-called party belonging or affiliation), change in the membership of citizens in cultural, religious, party and professional groups at parties, increase in electoral volatility, reducing the number of party members and increasing the commitment of voters to anti-systemic and anti-establishment parties⁷³. In addition, anti-partism and anti-party sentiments are the basis for the formation and development of non-traditional (especially involvement in strikes and demonstrations) and illegal (through measures to destroy property, paint graffiti in public places, etc.) forms of the citizens' participation in socio-political life representative democracy.

In general, it is stated in the research that the phenomenon of anti-partisanship is one of the primary but very important manifestations of the "decline" or "crisis" of political parties in European democracies, although it does not necessarily lead to, but can cause non-partisanship or technocracy.

In other words, this means that non-partism or technocracy is certainly a consequence of anti-party sentiments of both the politicum and the civil environment, but especially in the case of certain political or institutional crises, when political parties are unable to ensure their mission, including formation of some institutions of power in a country. At the same time, the article proves that anti-partisanship in European countries is a heterogeneous, not a monolithic and combined phenomenon, because it manifests itself in different ways and in different forms, in particular, primarily as a "reactive" one (concerning temporary political circumstances, in particular the level of satisfaction with the activities of party governments and in general by certain parties) and "cultural" one (which has been fairly stable over time and is associated with lower levels of education and political information and a widespread syndrome of political discontent in general) At the same time, "reactive anti-partism" has little effect on the election

⁷³ Poguntke T., *Anti-party Sentiment: Conceptual thoughts and Empirical Evidence: Explorations into a Minefield*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1996, vol 29, nr. 3, s. 319-344.

results and thus on party-electoral volatility, while “cultural anti-partism” has a much more significant effect to the psychological devotion to the parties and the variety of forms of traditional participation in the life of the party and the political process. What unites these forms of anti-partisanship is that they are the part of a general syndrome of political apathy, political discontent, and at least partial “erosion” of democracy, but, on the contrary, the peculiarities of anti-partism are inherent in each individual country and not in European representative democracies as a monolithic phenomenon. It follows that the phenomenon of non-partism is facilitated primarily by “reactive” rather than “cultural” anti-partism.

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